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Abstract. This article deepens the phenomenon of disinformation, providing an all-encompassing 
definition (proposed by the EU experts group) and subsequently analysing the actions put in place from 
2018 until now by the European Commission to tackle its spread. The EU strategy consists of two 
opposed instruments: regulation and communication. Both have some opportunities and some 
challenges that involve the risk of crossing the limits of the freedom of expression and the need of 
citizens active participation and commitment. The effort by the European Commission of developing a 
wise regulation will be introduced soon, whereas the media literacy campaign is enforced every year 
with the support of civil society organisations. The article lists the pros and cons of all the initiatives 
proposed, together with some reflections of non-EU experts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Disinformation is one of the biggest challenges faced by the European Union in the recent 
decades. It is a misunderstood and complex issue to address and, even more during the Covid-
19 pandemic, it is a dangerous enemy and it is essential to face it to the best of our ability.  
Living in a misinformative environment would lead to an ignorant society that would not 
be able to evolve and that, at the contrary, would become the creator and spreader of “fake 
news”. 
 
1 This is a slightly modified version of an article originally published in Italian for Pandora Rivista. It can be found 




The EU is implementing various actions to tackle online disinformation, but, before 
delving into what they are, citizens firstly need a clear definition of what disinformation is, in 
order to be able to recognise it. This first step is already difficult. In fact, the big problem with 
this concept is that there isn’t a universally shared definition and its boundaries are not clear. 
The article will present the definition by the European Commission. Secondly, its aim is to 
collect the current methods used by the European Union to combat this phenomenon and to 
protect the European democratic system.  
The European Commission, four years after the public commitment to tackle 
disinformation, is continuing to promote education campaigns of media literacy, transparency 
by online platforms, and is currently developing a law proposal to stop it at the legal level. 
The final objective is to provide a clear picture of the initiatives in place to allow the 
reader to develop a critical knowledge and opinion of the subject. The interest is to incentivise 
citizens to take an active and positive approach towards information.   
 
DEFINITION 
First of all, it is important to clarify that the concept of "fake news", often used to refer 
to this phenomenon, is limiting and considered inappropriate. The European Union, and in 
particular the European Commission, hired a team of experts in January 2018 to study and try 
to counter the phenomenon of "fake news" (focusing specifically on those that are spread 
online). This group of experts, called HLEG, High-Level Expert Group on Fake News and 
Disinformation3, concluded its mandate with the publication in March 2018 of a report that 
aims to review best practices to address this issue and proposes a more comprehensive name: 
disinformation.  
In fact, with this concept it is possible to include not only false news, but also partially 
or completely true news. If, on one hand, we cannot limit ourselves to only tackle fakes, on the 
other, we cannot even consider only news and not other types of content. Disinformation is not 
necessarily brought by news, for example it can concern fake users, modified videos, false 
numbers, target ads. These examples refer only to the world of the Internet, proof of the breadth 
of the topic.  
 
3 The formal cooperation of this Group finished with the publication of the report. 
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An example, dated back to a few years ago, is the publication by the former US President 
Donald Trump of a video that according to its caption depicted Mexican immigrants illegally 
crossing the US border, when in reality they were images shot in Morocco. (Collins, 2016). 
Also in the report, the group of experts hired by the Commission clarified: 
“Disinformation as defined here includes forms of speech that fall outside already illegal forms 
of speech, notably defamation, hate speech, incitement to violence, etc. but can nonetheless be 
harmful. It is a problem of actors — state or nonstate political actors, for-profit actors, citizens 
individually or in groups — as well as infrastructures of circulation and amplification through 
news media, platforms, and underlying networks, protocols and algorithms. In the near future, 
it will increasingly involve communication via private messaging applications, chat bots, and 
voice-operated systems, as well as augmented reality and virtual reality and content generated 
or manipulated by AI.” (European Commission, 2018a). 
Another important point in the same report stresses the role of dissemination: 
disinformation doesn’t stop only with the creation of “fake news”, but also concerns its 
circulation and spreading. Another reason why these experts reject the term is because they 
consider it misleading: several studies show that today the majority of the population links this 
definition to the political debate and in particular to low-level journalism, not to all the facets 
indicated above. (Nielsen and Graves, 2017).  
 
RESPONSES FROM THE EU 
Now is the time to look at how the European Union has proposed to tackle 
disinformation. In 2015, the European Council (made up of the Heads of State or Government 
of the Member States) delegated the Commission to respond to the disinformation episodes 
that were characterising political campaigns in Russia. The competence of the digital single 
market is shared between the European Union and the Member States, which means that States 
can act and create laws as long as the European Union has not intervened. This is necessary to 
have an homogenous regulation in Europe. The first step in adopting a shared approach at EU 
level is represented by the Communication on tackling online disinformation of 26 April 2018. 
The strategies presented by the EU, from that moment on, are of two opposite types: one 






Actions related to communication mainly concern information and active education. 
More commonly called media literacy, it aims at increasing citizens' awareness on the use of 
information by the media and therefore to develop a critical thinking. A clear definition of it 
had been proposed by the European Commission as early as 2007: "Media literacy may be 
defined as the ability to access, analyse and evaluate the power of images, sounds and messages 
which we are now confronted with on a daily basis and are an important part of our 
contemporary culture, as well as to communicate competently in media available on a personal 
basis. Media literacy relates to all media, including television and film, radio and recorded 
music, print media, the Internet and other new digital communication technologies. The aim of 
media literacy is to increase awareness of the many forms of media messages encountered in 
our everyday lives. It should help citizens recognise how the media filter their perceptions and 
beliefs, shape popular culture and influence personal choices. It should empower them with 
critical thinking and creative problem-solving skills to make them judicious consumers and 
producers of information. Media education is part of the basic entitlement of every citizen, in 
every country in the world, to freedom of expression and the right to information and it is 
instrumental in building and sustaining democracy." (EAVI, 2009).  
The type of commitment that the Commission has been showing in recent years is the 
support of projects and initiatives in this sense, the encouragement to the participation of 
individual States in the fight against disinformation with all available means, the establishment 
of the European Media Literacy Week and the coordination of a group of media literacy 
experts. The latter meets annually and has as objectives the identification and promotion of 
good practices related to media literacy, the creation of a network between different 
stakeholders to encourage the practice, the creation of new synergies between European 
policies and the support to programs and initiatives in this field. The group is led by the 
European Commission and is made up of Member States and observers, in particular experts 
nominated by candidate countries and EEA countries, representatives of associations active on 
this issue, of international organisations, researchers and universities. 
 
REGULATION  
Regulation provides for the application of rules and laws that precisely moderate the web 
space. The types of regulation recently proposed by the European Commission are, on one 
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hand, transparency and, on the other, the tools for verifying the information and the content 
that Internet users and all other web players publish, with a possible action of posthumous 
reporting or censorship. The word transparency derives from the Latin word trans parere, to 
let know; in this case the recipient is the citizen and the goal is to make the knowledge of public 
administrations, European institutions and international organisations accessible to all. It is 
precisely where this transparency is lacking that disinformation spreads. 
Verification tools usually refer to factchecking before or after publication. The most 
classic is the review that is normally done before sharing an article, to ensure the quality of the 
content. The second possibility is the posthumous control which is activated following a 
complaint and involves the search for reliable sources to confirm or deny the appeal, or 
following the regulations and laws in force in the given State. There are two tools for 
factchecking: monitoring and algorithms. The goal is the same, what differentiates them is who 
carries out the fact-check: in the first case they are experts, in the second automatic checks, 
processed on the computer.  
Monitoring is a systematic and periodic investigation, a continuous observation to 
identify illegal content in the web space with the aim of eliminating, modifying or improving 
them. In recent years, IT experts, technicians and journalists have also worked on creating 
automatic fact-checking tools. The advantage is that these tools do not require continuous 
monitoring by an expert on every webpage and content. These tools are algorithms or 
systematic calculation procedures that lead to the solution of one or more problems. In the case 
of disinformation, algorithms rely on an assessment of the credibility and relevance of the 
statements they analyse. The Commission has activated some tools that monitor the virtual 
environment, such as the Europe Media Monitor, but they do not specifically concern 
disinformation. Regarding the deletion of content, the European Commission has issued a 
proposal to use algorithms to delete explicitly illegal content, such as terrorism-related speech 
(Regulation of terrorist content, European Commission, 2018b), which cannot be labelled as 
disinformation. One tool that is responsible for ensuring that content deleted once doesn’t 
reappear online is the International hash database, but even the latter does not deal with 
disinformation but with terrorism. The reason why there aren’t tools or proposals regarding the 
removal of disinformative content is linked to the risk of limiting freedom of expression 
(United Nations, 1948). 
Since the release of the Communication on tackling online disinformation in April 2018, 
the Commission has proposed various actions in the same year, such as a package of measures 
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to ensure free and fair elections in September, which, as regards the prevention of 
disinformation, proposes more transparency in online political advertising. Also in September, 
the Code of good practices against disinformation comes out, inviting online platforms to 
register voluntarily and report to the Commission the actions taken to improve ad control, 
ensure the transparency of advertising and block fake accounts and malicious use of bots, with 
monthly recurrence. It is the first time that platforms, social networks and members of the 
advertising industry have accepted to submit to regulatory standards. Popular names include 
Facebook, Twitter, Mozilla, Google and Microsoft. The success of this measure is still high 
given the continuous adhesions, for this reason, an implementation by the Commission is 
planned for this spring.  
In November 2018, the Observatory for Social Media Analysis (OSMA) was launched, 
a pilot project that aimed to test a centre that dealt with the verification of facts. In 2020 it was 
replaced by the European Digital Media Observatory, a long-term follow-up that aims at 
creating European hubs for fact-checkers, academics and other stakeholders. Another initiative 
dates back to March 2019 and is the Rapid Alert System. It proposes a secure network with 
which EU institutions and Member States can share information on ongoing disinformation 
campaigns, in order to coordinate responses. More recently (December 2020) another Action 
Plan for European Democracy was presented which also has among its objectives that of 
combating disinformation (by updating the initiatives mentioned above). The measures will be 
implemented during the current mandate of the European Commission. In 2023, the year of the 
next European elections, the Commission will review the implementation of this Action Plan. 
The first legislative instrument that will provide elements to tackle disinformation is the 
Digital Services Act, proposed on 15 December 2020. The rules presented in this proposal, 
which at the moment is subject to the ordinary legislative procedure4, have three objectives: to 
better protect consumers and their fundamental rights online, to establish a platform structure 





4 This is the procedure that every law proposal must follow in order to become effective, being approved and 
negotiated by the various bodies of the European Union. Usually, this procedure lasts about two years. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
We clearly see how the European Commission provides various initiatives of different 
nature and means. Looking at the effects of the various actions, various experts remain 
skeptical on some of them and positive on others. Starting with regulation through laws and 
sanctions, this tool is deemed wrong for this challenge. It is the same group of experts hired by 
the Commission that warns on the danger of entrusting the government or private experts with 
the control of freedom of expression. This was also reported by Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, 
Research Director at the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of 
Oxford, during a conference in Brussels in 2018 entitled “Preserving democracy in the digital 
age” (Reuters Institute, 2018). Nielsen explained that it is really risky to leave this power in the 
hands of the judiciary or the executive, because in this way the openness of our society is 
jeopardized and it is equally inappropriate to start exclusion procedures without having clearly 
defined the crime.  
The thought is shared regarding the monitoring strategy, whether human or automatic. 
The criticism looks at the lack of transparency on the methods used for this control. One 
example is the Kremlin's monitoring of disinformation. Already in 2015, the European Union 
launched a campaign called "EuvsDisinfo" managed by the European External Action Service 
which publishes a Disinformation Review every week. Here are named some pro-Kremlin 
disinformation messages and websites. There is no direct action, but apparently there isn’t even 
an explanation on the method used to identify them. Suspicion increases when it is discovered 
that several websites have already complained of the unfair labelling of "disseminator of 
disinformation" (Cuniberti, 2018).  
Public opinion on automatic algorithms is even worse. Lucas Graves, researcher at the 
Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, circumscribes the capacity of algorithms, 
explaining how they are still incapable of replicating the sensitive contextual judgments 
required in verifying the facts (Graves, 2018). These tools can best interpret and verify simple 
and clear information, but always with human control behind it. 
For these reasons, the European Union has always been reticent and cautious in creating 
laws that regulate the web space. It has been more than three years since the first signal of the 
Commission of taking over this problem and only this year we see the first law proposal that 
will perhaps see life in 2022. This means that the need to regulate the Internet is essential to 
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protect citizens and their rights, but the study of how to do it must be meticulous and almost 
“omniscient”.  
On the contrary, two types of actions are universally considered very useful and 
interesting: transparency and media literacy. To ensure the first, the Union offers citizens to 
participate in the decision-making process through public consultations and feedbacks, it gives 
access to online documents and information on all ongoing activities. Furthermore, it makes 
visible the beneficiaries of EU funding, the lobbies interested in influencing the creation of 
laws, the committees that supervise the Commission when it adopts certain implementations, 
regulates the experts who have the task of evaluating the winners of the various European 
announcements, and more.  
On the other hand, education is always a positive but difficult initiative: it concerns the 
construction of awareness, but it must be actively followed by citizens at all stages of their life. 
Again, the education of citizens is not the task of the EU, but of the individual States. Each 
State has a certain level of media literacy, as well as a different cultural, social and historical 
situation that prevents a single approach and a single media literacy campaign, because they 
would not achieve the same result. It requires "custom" actions.  
In conclusion, it is clear that the fight against disinformation is a long and slow "war", 
but improving the relationship with citizens through transparency, education and participation 
is the first and most important step; the second is to understand how to protect users without 
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